Op-ed by Karen Harutyunyan, Editor-in-Chief
On March 24, Armenia’s Constitutional Court ruled that the Rome Statute complies with the country’s constitution. At the end of 2022, the Armenian government decided to restart the process of ratifying the treaty that established the International Criminal Court, citing Azerbaijan’s aggressive actions against Armenia, especially last September’s attack on Armenia’s borders.
On March 17, days before the Armenian Constitutional Court’s decision, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of war crimes in Ukraine.
If Armenia’s parliament ratifies the Rome Statute, then it would be obliged to arrest Putin and hand him over to the court if he visits. However, there are different legal interpretations of this provision, and it is obvious that no country in the world would arrest the president of Russia, a nuclear superpower.
And so, our problem here is exclusively political. What signal are we sending to the Kremlin, and what can we expect from it?
Many people in Armenia rightfully blame Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization it leads for failing in its alliance obligations and not providing military and political support to Armenia in response to Azerbaijan’s encroachments. Moscow has also failed in its commitment to ensure unrestricted traffic through the Lachin Corridor.
Let’s leave aside why everything is currently in this state. Logic suggests that no Armenian government could afford to ignore the possible countermeasures that Moscow, having found itself a geopolitical outcast, could take against this small and already extremely vulnerable country.
Apparently, a number of Armenian state bodies have opposing positions on this matter. The Foreign Ministry, headed by Ararat Mirzoyan is more balanced in its statements and actions toward Russia, while the Security Council, led by Armen Grigoryan, is more of a hawk against Russia.
I am deeply convinced that the timing of the Constitutional Court’s decision is not a coincidence. It was also preceded by Armenia’s refusal to nominate a candidate for the post of CSTO deputy secretary general.
But is there a calculation behind these steps? Judging by the foreign policy of the previous four and a half years, I would say there is no calculation. Or if there is, then it is one with an extremely high risk.
Armenia cannot turn itself into a theater of conflict for geopolitical interests. That should be avoided as much as possible by explaining and convincing global and regional actors to do the opposite in our case. It is a very obvious idea, and it is the truth.
Moscow has a large arsenal of tools with which to punish us. Yesterday it was already reported that Russia may limit dairy imports from Armenia due to “incomplete control and violations” by the Armenian side.
Let’s list some possible countermeasures that Russia could take if relations with Armenia deteriorate further.
- Make gas more expensive. Armenia buys Russian gas at a heavily discounted price of $165 per 1000 cubic meters. Only Belarus pays less. Armenia’s energy sector is highly dependent on Russian gas. This step could have devastating consequences on other branches of the economy, especially the export industry. It may also lead to higher inflation.
- Close the Upper Lars checkpoint, the only overland route from Armenia to Russia. Armenia’s largest export market is Russia, where mainly agricultural products, canned goods, and beverages are exported.
- Announce that Armenian products and produce do not meet Russian quality control standards, restricting their sale.
- Stop the supply of nuclear fuel to Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power plant.
- Block the entry of the hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who travel from Armenia to Russia every year.
And most perilously, Russia could “allow” Azerbaijan to launch an attack on the Syunik region and forcibly open an overland corridor via Syunik to Nakhichevan.
What can Armenia do to oppose all of this? I don’t know.
It is most likely that the government of Armenia, after these possible Russian steps, will once again make Russia the main scapegoat and direct public anger away from itself.
And what will the state of Armenia gain from it? Let ordinary Armenian citizens try and answer this question, refraining from geopolitical judgments and preferences. Loving or hating one or another country cannot be state policy.
Հոդվածը կարդացե՛ք հայերեն՝ Ռուսաստանի հետ հարաբերություններում Հայաստանն իրեն դնում է չափազանց վտանգավոր վիճակում․ ինչ սպասել
