By Alexander Pracht
Recent statements made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in an interview with Russian state media regarding French supplies of “offensive lethal weapons” to Armenia and Yerevan’s alleged inability to keep up in an arms race, even with Western support, reflect Baku’s growing unease. Behind the Azerbaijani leader’s public reaction lie lesser-known developments within the Armenian Armed Forces. Yerevan has disclosed very few details about its military modernization, intensifying interest in the actual needs of Armenia’s military and the structural reforms required. This interest has been further heightened by Armenia’s recent announcement of a 20% increase in its military budget for the upcoming year.
While Aliyev accuses the EU monitoring mission in Armenia of hostility and Armenia of “militarization,” Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan has been meeting with counterparts from the U.S. and France in recent weeks. Statements following these meetings often look nearly identical, briefly mentioning the “presentation of Armenian army reforms” to foreign defense officials. However, the specifics of these reforms remain unclear—it is unlikely that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is particularly concerned with reducing the length of Armenia’s mandatory military service.
Structural issues in Armenia’s military
The main problems of Armenia’s military are systemic, and the supply of weapons is not among them, says Eduard Arakelyan, a military expert at the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank. “It’s much easier to purchase weapons than to address deep-rooted problems—of course, assuming there’s money, which the budget appears to have,” Arakelyan says. In his view, structural changes should be the primary goal of military reforms to untangle the web of obstacles hindering an effective military.
A key issue is the shortage of personnel and inefficient use of conscripts. The root cause lies in the military’s lack of prestige as hazing, criminal subcultures, nepotism, and poor discipline dominate the armed forces. While tackling hazing, which alarmingly often leads to non-combat casualties, requires legal reforms, increasing the professionalism of commanders calls for foreign expertise.
“The Armenian military needs commanders educated in foreign academies. In 2020, outdated tactics and Soviet-era practices were among the reasons why Armenia lost the war,” Arakelyan argues.
Improving the professionalism of military leadership could attract more recruits, partially by reducing the length of conscription. Currently, the shortage of conscripts is made worse by the inefficient use of their potential during an extended service term, which increasingly deters young people from joining an already unappealing military.
“A two-year service term is wrong. With proper management, a conscript can be taught all the necessary skills in six months, namely urban and open-field combat, room clearing, radio communication, navigation, driving, and first aid. Then, for another six months, they could apply these skills in practice, for instance, guarding the border with Azerbaijan,” Arakelyan explains.
Armenia needs to accelerate the digitization of its military recruitment process to achieve the necessary number of conscripts, according to Leonid Nersisyan, a military analyst at APRI Armenia. This would help Armenia get rid of military conscription offices. “Many IT companies in Armenia can do this. Technically, there is nothing left to do, because our IDs and passport are digital,” he explains.
The digital database would also prove valuable during potential mobilization as it would enable the armed forces to call up people with experience in specific military branches that need reinforcement at the front.
Western arms and shifting alliances
As for modernizing its arsenal, Armenia has been forced to look for suppliers in Western countries. The turning point prompting Armenia to purchase Western weapons and suspend its membership in the Russian-led CSTO alliance was not only the defeat in the 44-day war but also Azerbaijan’s incursions into Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces in September 2022, followed by the occupation of Armenian territories along the border.
“After the 2020 war, Armenia relied on Russia, prepaying for weapons that were never delivered,” Arakelyan says. “Following September 2022, the government realized this was a mistake and turned to the global market.”
Russia chose not to fulfill its commitments due to its own need for weapons and ammunition after invading Ukraine in February 2022, which significantly diminished Moscow’s regional presence in the South Caucasus.
“After February 2022, Azerbaijani forces began improving their positions in Karabakh, preparing for an offensive. Before Russia’s war in Ukraine, its peacekeepers still had some influence, but afterward, Azerbaijan ignored them,” Arakelyan recounts.
The wars in Ukraine and Karabakh have drawn significant attention to drones and their role in modern warfare.
Nersisyan points out the fact that Armenia produces drones that are quite comparable to Indian ones, adding that they are relatively inexpensive.
“Before 2020 in, as in Russia before 2022, the old leadership of Armenia’s military didn’t realize why drones are so important. Of course, Armenia now has more drones, including domestic ones. There have been challenges, but overall, these drones aren’t the worst,” Arakelyan notes. However, he does not consider UAVs the most critical tool in modern war.
“Artillery remains paramount. Infantry cannot assault positions without artillery fire,” Arakelyan argues. Armenia has already acquired artillery systems from France and India and is likely to continue doing so. These include French CAESAR howitzers and their lighter Indian counterparts.
In addition to artillery, India supplies Armenia with multiple rocket launcher systems (214 mm caliber), short- and medium-range air defense systems, anti-drone electronic warfare systems, and anti-tank weapons.
Air defense systems remain one of Armenia’s weak points, as many were destroyed during the 2020 war. Nersisyan observes that in 2020, Armenia effectively lacked even medium-range air defense systems. He explains that while the Russian Tor anti-aircraft system, used now in the military, is good, it presents problems when enemy targets fly at altitudes of six kilometers.
Search for flexibility
In November, Greek media reported that Athens might transfer modernized S-300 systems and other Russian-made equipment to Yerevan after 2026, once Greece replaces them with Israeli air defenses.
Such a deal would likely require Moscow’s approval but could be advantageous for all three parties. “It’s beneficial for Russia to sell these systems to Armenia because it will then provide maintenance, parts, and ammunition. Greece would also benefit from the deal since they’re not using these systems now,” Arakelyan says, adding that Moscow might agree to the sale to prevent the equipment from ending up in Ukraine.
Armenia is also interested in acquiring air defense systems from France, but high demand and European red tape mean deliveries may take five to six years, Arakelyan estimates.
Domestic bureaucracy also creates significant problems for military modernization. “You can’t just buy 100,000 FPV drones as they’re going to become garbage after one year, because this technology is evolving rapidly. Instead, you need to have a unit of, let’s say, FPV guys, a spec ops unit of 30-40 people,” Nersisyan suggests. These drone experts will then need to be provided with funding and face as little red tape as possible to remain agile and effective. They should also have the authority to procure the drones they deem most suitable and oversee specialized training.
Constant threats from Baku and the overall situation in the South Caucasus and the Middle East complicate Armenia’s military reform prospects. However, the secrecy surrounding weapons acquisitions offers some optimism. By exercising its sovereign right to strengthen its defense, Armenia signals its readiness to protect its independence despite Azerbaijani pressure.
