By Arshaluys Mghdesyan
As discussions on constitutional changes gain momentum in Armenia, constitutional law specialist and American University of Armenia professor Armen Mazmanyan warns that such reforms risk deepening the country’s already extreme political polarization. Speaking to CivilNet, Mazmanyan argues that this is not the right moment for adopting a new constitution, as Armenia is at a spiritual low point and severely divided as a society.
A constitution amid crisis?
On February 19, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in an address to the nation that a new constitution was necessary, arguing that “all previous constitutional referendums have suffered from a serious legitimacy deficit in public perception.”
The need for constitutional changes has been discussed since the 2018 revolution, but the debate has intensified over the past year, mainly due to Azerbaijan’s demands. Baku insists that Armenia’s constitution implies territorial claims against Azerbaijan, particularly referencing its preamble, which cites the 1990 Declaration of Independence. That declaration, in turn, refers to a 1989 decision by Soviet Armenia to reunify with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.
Mazmanyan, however, believes this is not the right time for such a fundamental change. “Successful constitutions are adopted during historical junctures—times of public enthusiasm and spiritual awakening,” he explains. He points to the U.S. Constitution, which was adopted at a moment of historical transformation following the country’s independence. “If we assess today’s situation from this perspective, we are rather at the lowest point of spiritual and political decline. To draft a new constitution and rely on its becoming a civic contract at such a moment is a highly consequential and meaningless enterprise.”
Mazmanyan stresses that Armenia is at its most polarized in recent history, making broad public support for a new constitution impossible. “In moments of such extreme division, even the most well-crafted idea cannot gain public trust,” he warns. “A constitution, as a social contract, must be adopted through broad consensus. Of course, not every citizen will vote for it, but it requires widespread public support—something that is simply unattainable in today’s Armenia.”
He further argues that without this legitimacy, constitutional reform could backfire. “At best, such a move will be supported only by the ruling authorities and their ideological allies, but that will only deepen societal fractures.”
Unaddressed issues in the reform process
Mazmanyan also highlights key issues missing from the public debate. As a member of the Constitutional Reform Commission, he was involved in drafting proposals aimed at limiting executive power and strengthening democratic oversight. These included reducing parliamentary terms from five years to four, capping the prime minister’s tenure at two terms, reinforcing the role of the country’s president, and enhancing parliamentary oversight of the government.
However, these proposals have largely been ignored. “I assume there were internal discussions within government offices, perhaps even shock—‘How can they propose limiting our power?’” he says. He underscores that constitutions must be written with the assumption of bad governance, ensuring checks and balances to prevent abuses of power and authoritarianism. However, according to him, there is no sensitivity to that fundamental tenet of constitutionalism – that constitutions are an instrument of limiting the power and safeguarding our freedom, and our institutions, from government abuse.
Mazmanyan also criticizes the idea of ”having the constitution discussed with the people”, calling it a populist approach. “Discussing the constitution with ‘the people,’ as the prime minister suggests, is pure populism,” he argues. “Constitutional changes must first and foremost be discussed among political elites, who bear responsibility for governance. At the same time, the process should not exclude professional elites and the intellectuals—universities, analytical centers, and scholars—whose expertise is crucial. But where are they in this debate? What do they think about the proposed constitutional changes?”
A history of Armenia’s constitutions
Armenia has undergone multiple constitutional transformations. The first constitution, adopted in 1995, established a presidential system. In 2005, the country transitioned to a semi-presidential system, and in 2015, it shifted to a parliamentary model. After the 2018 revolution, Pashinyan pledged to change the constitution, calling it “super prime-ministerial” and arguing that it concentrated excessive power in the hands of the prime minister. However, amid shifting political realities, constitutional reforms were pushed to the background—until now.
Despite the government’s renewed push for reform, Mazmanyan remains skeptical. “The expectation that this process will result in a unifying social contract is an illusion,” he warns. “Without legitimacy and broad consensus, this effort could further polarize Armenia’s fragile political landscape.”
Read the article in Armenian: Սահմանադրական փոփոխությունները կարող են խորացնել հասարակական բևեռացումը. սահմանադրագետ
Armen Mazmanyan, a constitutional law specialist and professor at the American University of Armenia, raises concerns about the timing and potential consequences of adopting a new constitution in Armenia. He argues that implementing such significant reforms during a period of societal polarization and low national morale may exacerbate existing divisions rather than foster unity. Mazmanyan emphasizes that constitutions are most effective when established during moments of collective enthusiasm and consensus, serving as a unifying social contract. He cautions that proceeding with constitutional changes without broad public support could lead to further fragmentation within Armenian society.
Azerbaijan’s assertion that Armenia’s current constitution implies territorial claims, particularly referencing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, adds a layer of complexity to this debate. To contextualize, consider if Germany’s constitution still alluded to territories lost to Poland after World War II. Such references could be perceived as ongoing territorial ambitions, potentially hindering diplomatic relations and regional stability. However, Germany formally recognized the Oder–Neisse line as its eastern border in the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970, thereby renouncing any territorial claims over former eastern territories now within Poland. This acknowledgment facilitated reconciliation and cooperation in Europe. Similarly, Armenia’s preamble to its constitution references the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which in turn cites a 1989 decision to reunify with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. This historical context could be interpreted by neighboring countries as an implicit territorial claim, potentially straining diplomatic relations. Addressing such references in the constitution might alleviate external pressures and demonstrate Armenia’s commitment to peaceful coexistence.
However, constitutional reform is not merely an academic exercise; it is also about practical governance and national security. Timing is of the essence, especially for a country facing existential threats from powerful adversaries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan. In an increasingly unstable global landscape—what some refer to as a new world disorder—playing academic and theoretical niceties does not correspond to the urgent realities Armenia faces. National resilience requires pragmatic decision-making, and if constitutional reforms help secure stability, international legitimacy, and peace, they should be prioritized accordingly.
Furthermore, concerns about constitutional manipulation should be viewed in the proper historical context. The most flagrant example of constitutional abuse in Armenia came under former leader Serzh Sargsyan, who orchestrated constitutional changes in 2015 to shift the country from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary one, only to position himself as “super-power prime minister” in 2018, consolidating his authority under the new system. This move, widely seen as a blatant power grab, directly contributed to public outrage and ultimately led to the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Unlike Sargsyan’s self-serving constitutional maneuvering, today’s constitutional discussions are centered on addressing national security concerns, governance efficiency, and Armenia’s geopolitical standing.
While Mazmanyan warns that constitutional changes must be approached with caution, his argument does not fully account for the pressing realities of Armenia’s current geopolitical situation. Constitutional adjustments should not be dismissed simply because they arise in turbulent times—rather, they should be evaluated based on their potential to strengthen the nation in the face of adversity. If reforming the constitution serves Armenia’s strategic interests, enhances stability, and facilitates diplomatic relations, then it is not only necessary but urgent.
Best regards,
Berge