By Karena Avedissian
Why İmamoğlu’s Arrest Matters
“The security forces have deployed hundreds of police to my house,” Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s main rival, said in a video message to supporters on Wednesday, March 19th. Moments later, he and several staff members were arrested.
İmamoğlu’s detention is not just about removing a political rival—it signals Erdoğan’s deepening concern over his hold on power. As a leader who has spent more than two decades consolidating control, Erdoğan is now facing an existential political challenge. A leading figure in the Republican People’s Party (CHP), İmamoğlu’s popularity, especially his ability to unite diverse voter blocs, makes him Erdogan’s most formidable opponent.
Erdoğan’s Playbook: A Familiar Pattern of Repression
The use of incarceration to eliminate political opponents is not new in Turkey. In May 2024, former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş was sentenced to 42 years in prison on charges of “undermining state unity” and “terrorist propaganda,” while fellow HDP leader Figen Yüksekdağ received a 30-year sentence—both widely considered politically motivated. Yet, as Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science at San Diego University argues, while Demirtaş and other HDP figures posed challenges to Erdoğan’s rule, they were never existential threats.
İmamoğlu, however, is different. His broad appeal across Turkey’s fragmented voter blocs makes him a serious contender in the next presidential race. His arrest follows Erdoğan’s familiar playbook: first, legal attacks—such as the revocation of his university diploma just a day before his detention—then criminal charges, and finally, a broader crackdown on dissent.
From the imprisonment of Kurdish leaders to the mass purges of civil servants after the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan has consistently used legal mechanisms to eliminate rivals and tighten his grip on power.
Why Now? Erdoğan’s 2028 Dilemma
Turkey has been on an increasingly autocratic trajectory, and İmamoğlu’s arrest represents yet another step in that direction.
The Turkish Constitution limits presidents to two five-year terms. Though Erdoğan has been elected three times, he justified his third run by claiming that his first term predated the 2017 constitutional amendments that transformed Turkey’s political system. If term limits are lifted, he could run for a fourth term—and potentially extend his rule indefinitely.
Under Turkey’s constitution, Erdoğan cannot run again in 2028 unless parliament calls for early elections or approves a constitutional amendment to lift term limits. Lacking the votes for either option, he must find alternative ways to extend his rule. Turkey’s recent outreach to jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan hints at a calculated move to secure Kurdish support in parliament. Yet, his ongoing crackdown on pro-Kurdish political movements suggests this is less about peace and more about political survival.
İmamoğlu’s arrest signals a critical shift in Turkey’s political landscape, with far-reaching implications for the next presidential election. It coincides with Erdoğan’s broader strategy to secure his political future. Facing term limits in 2028 and lacking the parliamentary support needed for early elections or constitutional changes, Erdoğan is now seeking an alternative path: winning the backing of pro-Kurdish parties.
What’s at Stake for Turkey’s Opposition?
The response to İmamoğlu’s arrest will determine whether Turkey’s opposition can mount an effective challenge in 2028. While protests have erupted, past attempts to mobilize against Erdoğan’s tightening grip have faltered due to divisions within the opposition. The question now is whether İmamoğlu’s case can unite Turkey’s fragmented opposition—including Kurdish, secular, and nationalist factions—into a coordinated political force.
This comes at a moment of growing vulnerability for Erdoğan and his ruling party. In Turkey’s 2024 municipal elections, for the first time since 2002, Erdoğan’s AKP fell to second place, while the opposition CHP emerged as the leading party by vote share. CHP secured major victories in key cities, including Istanbul, where İmamoğlu was reelected, and Ankara, where CHP’s Mansur Yavaş won another term. The election results signaled a significant shift in public sentiment, reflecting frustration with economic decline, government mismanagement, and increasing authoritarianism.
However, mounting a challenge in an increasingly repressive environment presents a difficult task. With control over the judiciary, security forces, and media, Erdoğan has systematically thwarted opposition efforts. İmamoğlu’s arrest demonstrates the use of legal mechanisms to neutralize political threats, raising concerns about whether the opposition can effectively mobilize when its most prominent figures are systematically repressed.
What Comes Next?
İmamoğlu remains a leading contender for the presidency, but his path forward is anything but certain. The CHP’s party’s response in the coming weeks will shape not only İmamoğlu’s fate but also the broader opposition’s ability to challenge Erdoğan in 2028.
At the same time, Erdoğan faces a delicate balancing act. While his crackdown on İmamoğlu is a clear attempt to eliminate a political threat, excessive repression risks further damaging Turkey’s already fragile economy and alienating even his own voter base.
İmamoğlu’s arrest is more than just an attack on one politician—it is a defining moment for Turkey’s political future. If Erdoğan succeeds in extending his rule through repression, Turkey’s shift toward full autocracy will be nearly complete.
The scale of the crackdown—street closures, mass arrests, and media censorship—mirrors repressive measures long used in Turkey’s Kurdish-majority cities, such as Van and Diyarbakır, where the state routinely justifies suppression under the pretext of combating the PKK.
However, in the wake of İmamoğlu’s arrest, some Kurds and the Turkish left have voiced frustration that when past instances of political repression—such as the assassinations of Hrant Dink or Sakine Cansız—took place, there was far less organized outrage from the CHP and other opposition circles. Now, with İmamoğlu’s arrest, those same forces are mobilizing. The movement for democracy in Turkey has historically been fragmented along ethnic, religious, and social lines, with varying levels of support for different marginalized groups including Kurds, Alevis, the LGBTIQ community, and those labeled as “expendable” by the state.
Despite the turmoil, the CHP’s internal election for its presidential candidate remains scheduled for Sunday, March 23rd, with İmamoğlu as the sole contender. Around 1.5 million party members are expected to vote, and CHP leader Özgür Özel has reaffirmed: “We will vote for İmamoğlu no matter where he is.” Whether this marks the beginning of a broader opposition movement—or another moment of repression without real resistance—will soon become clear.
