By Tigran Grigoryan
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid a working visit to Armenia on Wednesday following earlier visits by his Armenian counterpart Ararat Mirzoyan to Moscow and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s participation in Russia’s May 9 Victory Day parade. Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan marked a notable moment in the increasingly complex and fragile relationship between Armenia and Russia.
After three years of visible tension, his arrival, along with the tone of the meetings and the joint press conference, signaled an effort to manage the ongoing crisis in bilateral ties. While disagreements remain, particularly on security and defense issues, the atmosphere has shifted from public accusations to behind-closed-doors pragmatism.
Armenia’s perception of Russia has significantly evolved in the post-2020 (and especially post-2022) context. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has crippled Moscow’s role in the South Caucasus. No longer able to function as a security guarantor or regional arbiter, Moscow’s credibility has collapsed in Armenian eyes due to its failure to respond to Azerbaijani incursions into Armenia in 2021 and 2022, as well as its inaction during the 2023 ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia’s new cautious approach toward Russia is a recent development shaped by shifting international dynamics. The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States has led the Armenian leadership to adjust its foreign policy tone and direction. These changes became evident at the end of last year, with Yerevan softening its rhetoric toward Russia and stepping up diplomatic engagement.
This shift became even more pronounced in the first months of Trump’s new administration. His transactional approach to foreign policy has created uncertainty around the future of both European and global security order. The United States resumed direct contact with Russia, engaging in negotiations not only over the war in Ukraine but also on restoring broader bilateral relations.
Uncertainty in Yerevan has also grown regarding the extent of U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus under the new administration. After 2022, Washington’s active diplomatic role helped deter Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia proper. During that period, U.S.-Armenia relations advanced rapidly, culminating in the signing of the Strategic Partnership Charter in January 2025. Under Trump, the future of this emerging partnership is, however, uncertain.
In response to these shifts, the Armenian government accepted Azerbaijan’s demands in the peace treaty, making yet another unilateral concession. It has also reengaged with Moscow on key issues, marking a clear departure from earlier views in Yerevan, where many officials regarded dialogue with Russia as either futile or potentially harmful due to longstanding tensions and pressure.
However, what is unfolding now is not a revitalization of a strategic alliance, but rather Yerevan’s attempt to manage a crisis and mitigate the potential risks stemming from Russia.
Armenia’s efforts since September 2022 can be described as an attempt to diversify its foreign and security partnerships. This is not, as often framed, a “pivot to the West,” but a response to Russia’s withdrawal from its traditional role. Armenia’s outreach to France, India, the European Union, and the United States is a reaction to a deepening security vacuum, not a grand strategic shift.
When it comes to Yerevan’s new defense partnerships, Russia remains displeased, as it is losing its monopolistic hold over Armenia’s defense sector and is in no position to offer viable alternatives. However, even Lavrov, with some irritation, acknowledged Armenia’s right to acquire arms from any source, including countries Russia currently considers hostile, during his joint press conference with Ararat Mirzoyan.
The 2022 full-scale invasion in Ukraine triggered a boost in Russia’s arms production, although it exclusively served Moscow’s own needs. The 2021 arms contract between Yerevan and Moscow that included an advance payment of $400 million, has remained largely unfulfilled by Russia, leaving Armenia exposed at a critical juncture. Today, even Russian officials seem to understand they lack the leverage to dictate Armenia’s defense procurements, although they continue to issue rhetorical warnings about ties with Western states.
Yerevan’s policy toward the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also unlikely to change. Armenia has effectively frozen its participation in the organization following CSTO’s failure to respond to Azerbaijan’s attack in September 2022. Yerevan has managed to present this freezing of CSTO ties, along with its visible distancing from Russia’s war in Ukraine, as a way to strengthen its relations with the West. This approach produced limited but notable results.
There seems to be a tacit understanding between Moscow and Yerevan: Russia does not overreact to Armenia’s suspension of CSTO activity as long as there is no formal withdrawal from the alliance. Yerevan avoids a formal withdrawal to prevent potential Russian retaliation and because the current status quo does not hinder its efforts to establish new partnerships or deepen existing ones with the West.
There is also a growing perception that both sides now prioritize economic ties over restoring political and military relations to their previous levels. Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia remains significant and has increased further in recent years, while its trade turnover with Russia has surged since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.
As for geopolitical positioning, Yerevan’s messaging remains cautious. During the press conference with Lavrov, Foreign Minister Mirzoyan reaffirmed that Armenia is not seeking to abandon its formal alliance with Moscow, nor is it negotiating EU membership.
This reflects the current reality: while partnership diversification is underway, Armenia is not pursuing a full-scale geopolitical realignment. The government’s rhetoric on European integration, including the recently adopted law on EU accession, seems more geared toward domestic political positioning ahead of the 2026 elections than signaling a major institutional shift.
Ultimately, Armenia’s foreign policy today is best described as situational and reactive rather than strategic. This is not entirely the fault of policymakers in Yerevan. The international environment itself is volatile and in flux. From the uncertain trajectory of the Ukraine war to questions about the future of US-EU relations, the very foundations of the global order are being renegotiated. In such a context, small countries like Armenia have little choice but to improvise.
