By Paul Vartan Sookiasian
A recent statement from U.S. President Donald Trump administration envoy Steve Witkoff that Armenia and Azerbaijan may soon join the Abraham Accords has raised a number of questions about how the platform for Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel is relevant to the South Caucasus. However, according to CivilNet’s political commentator Eric Hacopian, in Trump’s second term the accords have grown beyond their original purpose into something far broader and more commercially driven.
Hacopian argued that the Accords are now functioning as a framework for embedding U.S. economic and security interests in strategically sensitive regions, including the South Caucasus. “The Abraham Accords are no longer about normalizing ties with Israel, but now serve as a superstructure for advancing U.S. commercial interests- construction, infrastructure, arms sales- without actually using traditional diplomatic means,” he said.
A strategic commercial offer
According to Hacopian, Armenia and Azerbaijan have likely been presented with non-negotiable proposals by U.S. actors. The offers may include U.S. construction of major infrastructure projects, such as the management and development of new transport corridors, and U.S. weapons sales.
Hacopian noted that U.S. involvement in such projects within the countries would serve as a sort of security guarantee, highlighting that “for Armenia, accepting this offer could mean deterring foreign aggression at a time when the country is most vulnerable.”
Azerbaijan had been promoting itself as a prospective member of the Accords, citing its long-standing strategic partnership with Israel. However, it may view the inclusion of Armenia as well as a challenge to its regional positioning. According to Hacopian, Baku had hoped to maintain exclusivity within the framework as a diplomatic advantage over Armenia. “If Armenia is brought into the same fold, Azerbaijan loses one of its key differentiators,” he said. “It’s unlikely Baku is happy about this development.”
Implications for the peace process
Amid this offer from the U.S., Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed on the text of a document to normalize their relations, but Baku has continued to resist signing it.
If agreed to, the Accords could bring signing of the normalization agreement closer, or could render it redundant.
“If U.S. guarantees are in place and aggression is off the table, the urgency of the normalization agreement may vanish,” he said. “Aliyev could use this as an excuse to delay signing without facing consequences.”
Strategic partnership and nuclear projects
Hacopian highlighted the deepening cooperation between the United States and Armenia as laying the groundwork for the kind of commercial partnerships the new Abraham Accords framework aims to promote. A key example, he noted, is the recent visit to Yerevan by representatives of the U.S. energy company Westinghouse, to discuss a replacement for Armenia’s aging Metsamor nuclear power plant, which supplies about 30% of the country’s electricity.
Metsamor is Russian-operated, so choosing an American firm to build its replacement would send a strong geopolitical signal, aligning Armenia more closely with the West. The multibillion-dollar project would not only be a major financial win for the U.S. but would also lock in long-term American involvement in Armenia. Although Russia has offered to provide its own reactor designs, Hacopian argued that Moscow is in no position to compete, both due to international sanctions and a lack of meaningful leverage.
Ultimately, Hacopian framed Armenia’s possible inclusion in the modern Abraham Accords as a short-term security opportunity rather than a diplomatic breakthrough, saying: “Anything that gets U.S. security attention into Armenia, even indirectly, is a good thing in the near term. It buys us the time we need to build up our own defense capacity. Long-term issues can be dealt with once we’re no longer vulnerable.”
This article is based on Hacopian’s latest CivilNet podcast.
For more: Armenia and the Abraham Accords: Strategic Opportunity or Diplomatic Trap?