By Vartan Oskanian, Armenia’s Former Foreign Minister
In an op-ed released to the media, Armenia’s Former Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian discusses the need to formulate a new Armenian agenda for the forthcoming Karabakh negotiations.
This is a translation of the original version of the article, which appeared in Armenian.
Judging by the recent news, we can assume that the Karabakh negotiations will soon resume within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. Taking into account that the status quo has turned on its head as a result of the 44-day war, it is difficult to predict how this process will develop. Even for the skilled diplomats of the Minsk co-chair countries, it is difficult to decide what position to take, and how to launch this new process.
On the one hand, the positions of the three co-chair countries are unlikely to be as coherent as before because of the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno Karabakh, and Russia’s strengthened position politically. And on the other hand, the co-chair countries don’t clearly know the positions with which the parties will enter the negotiation process.
The agenda that Armenia will present at this first important meeting will be critical in influencing and even determining the content of the document that will be formed, evolved and finalized throughout the course of the negotiations.
In the last 25 years, the Minsk Group has presented five proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Each of these five proposals, without exception, has reflections of the policy pursued by the Armenian authorities of that day and the principles they had espoused on the Karabakh issue.
Levon Ter-Petrossian’s Karabakh policy was anchored on his sober assessment of Armenia’s real and existing potential of that time, coupled with his implicit realism towards international geopolitical events. Ter-Petrossian was convinced that the prevailing post-Cold War international sentiments made it impossible to achieve full self-determination for Nagorno Karabakh outside of Azerbaijan. His logic, therefore, was that if we, as a nation, demand a comprehensive solution to the Karabakh problem, then we must come to terms with its high autonomy within Azerbaijan, or, we should accept a step-by-step solution.
Interestingly, in 1997 the Minsk Group offered us two consecutive documents, which fully reflected Ter-Petrossian’s logic. The first was the “package” option, which stipulated high autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh within Azerbaijan. This was immediately rejected by Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. The subsequent “step-by-step” proposal—return of territories around Nagorno Karabakh without any clarification of its political status—was immediately followed, which Ter-Petrossian considered as the lesser of the two evils. Later, this became one of the reasons for his resignation.
Robert Kocharyan’s Karabakh policy was based not on his assessment of Armenia’s actual, but on its future potential. Kocharyan was convinced that through better organization and good governance, it would be possible to ensure progress and consequently a more favorable negotiating position. This notion was also coupled with a pragmatic world-view of international politics. This pragmatism was manifested in the sound assessment of the geopolitical developments of the day, and his willingness, against his own conviction, to formulate Armenian demands in less than extreme and maximalist terms. During that time, Armenia’s demands were: a) Horizontal relations between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan and not a hierarchical one, b) security guarantees for Nagorno Karabakh, c) unimpeded access for Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia.
It is interesting that during Kocharyan’s ten years in power there were three proposals from the Minsk Group: The “Common State”, which offered horizontal relations between Karabakh and Azerbaijan; The “Key West,” stipulating Karabakh’s reversion to Armenian sovereignty; and the “Madrid Principles,” mandating an interim status outside of Azerbaijan, with the prospect of a referendum in the future.
Serzh Sargsyan’s period was mostly a carry over from Kocharyan’s era. New documents were not produced during that period. Instead, various changes were made to the Madrid document, including what came to be known as the “Lavrov plan”. This was essentially a “step-by-step” version of the Madrid document.
Nikol Pashinyan’s initial position on the Karabakh issue was uncertain and chaotic. Unfortunately, he did not wish to consult with anyone who was part of or affiliated with former administrations. He had no policy direction, did not know where he was heading, and never felt the need to stop and wonder if he was going the wrong way.
Later on, Pashinyan came up with the idea—which seems to have become the cornerstone of his Karabakh policy—that the solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict should be acceptable to the peoples of Armenia, Artsakh and Azerbaijan. Many critics and commentators insist that one of the reasons for the outbreak of the war was Pashinyan’s affirmation that “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.” But I think it was this very idea that prompted Azerbaijan to justify the impossibility of resolving the issue through negotiations. Azerbaijan perceived this policy pronouncement as cynical, compounded with unfounded idealism.
In the post-war period, on the eve of the possible resumption of negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group, Pashinyan’s cynicism and idealism have now assumed a new articulation. The former is reflected in his marginalization of the Armenian losses and, what is more painful and dangerous, in their justification. And the latter, his idealism, is manifested in his latest proposal to open a new era of peace in the region.
Let us note that Azerbaijan does not seek peace. Instead, Azerbaijan will use the negotiations to fulfill his unfinished demands, and to formalize and legitimize her spoils of war.
For Armenia, if the pursuit of peace becomes an end in itself, then the fear of war will become a weapon in the hands of the adversary, which will, at the very least, lead us to a moral disarmament.
I would very much like to see Pashinyan not repeat his previous mistakes and not commence negotiations unprepared. Here, I would not like to advise again on the contents of Armenia’s policy position. I have done this in five articles published after the war, and especially in the last one, entitled “Nagorno Karabakh: Everything’s not lost, much can be restored“. I remain of the same opinion.
But here I would like to make several tactical suggestions:
1. To prepare well for the talks, Pashinyan must be able to rise above narrow interests, and consult with the people who can contribute to this issue, regardless of the labels he gives them.
2. The executive and legislative branches of the government must refrain from justifying losses and from pronouncements that don’t serve Armenia’s interests. In general, they should be careful with their every word. I fear that the high-ranking Armenian officials do not comprehend this.
3. In the negotiations, Armenia should not strive for peace. Rather, the Armenian side should seek to establish a legitimate order in and around Nagorno Karabakh, the cornerstone of which should not be the balance of power, but the balance of satisfaction of the parties and the prospect of a just settlement. Only this could bring lasting peace.
4. Never be pressured in terms of time and do not rush on the road towards a comprehensive solution to the issue. This is where the Armenian side should adopt the “step-by-step” approach for addressing the conflict.
5. While being cognizant of the global and regional big picture, as well as the various interests of the key players, never be guided by them. Rather, always be focused on the very specific and narrow problem before us, led, first and foremost, by national priorities.
Everything’s not lost. Much can be restored.
